Access Control on Grid Management Pages

It is my great pleasure to be an author of M3 Ideas. Thanks very much for Thibaud’s invitation.

I put my foot into M3 water five years ago and M3 Ideas has been giving me great help in developing my technical skills since then. It is my great honor to share my work and make contributions to it.

The issue of access control on grid management pages has been a trouble to me for nearly two years. The installation web page of ISO, in our case, http://BE Server:19005/LSO/index.html is very close to the grid information page, http://BE Server:19005/grid/info.html and the grid management pages, http://BE Server:19005/grid/ui/#. It is fairly easy for a user with web skills to figure out the latter two web pages and he/she can explore and check basically all the grid information.

Although the grid management pages requires credentials to log on to be able to start or stop a process, a user actually can try the default account,  and the famous password, which are mentioned by the Companion, to get full control. This is not a joke, but a real case. It makes M3 system really vulnerable. Even if users do not make any actions to it, there is no sense and it is ridiculous to disclose all the system information to the public.

We did raise InforXtreme case for Infor to fix it. However, they could not give a robust solution after a long time discussion. The reason is the grid management pages and LSO is sharing the same Java process in the BE server. If you check the TCP connections and processes using netstat in the BE server, you would find there is no way to tell which connection is from the grid management pages visit or from LSO request, which is the biggest technical challenge.

After many tests it seems the most feasible solution is to analyze each incoming and outgoing TCP packet in the BE sever to see whether there are any patterns. If we can be 100% sure that a remote IP address is visiting the grid management pages according to the patterns, then we can apply IPSec to block it automatically. Although it means that IP address cannot use LSO as well, it can be sorted out by manually removing it from the black list given a promise is made not to visit again. If the promise is broken, there is no second chance for them. It is something like Damocles’ Sword.

So I made a Console Application using C# as follows.

using System;
using System.Collections.Generic;
using SharpPcap;
using SharpPcap.LibPcap;
using System.Text;
using System.Net.Mail;
using System.Diagnostics;

namespace CA_Grid
class CA_Grid
static List<string> jsIPList;

static void Main(string[] args)
jsIPList = new List<string>();

var varDevices = CaptureDeviceList.Instance;

if(varDevices.Count<1) { Console.WriteLine("No devices were found on this machine"); return; } Console.WriteLine("The following devices are available on this machine:"); Console.WriteLine("----------------------------------------------------"); Console.WriteLine(); int i = 0; foreach(var varDec in varDevices) { Console.WriteLine("{0}) {1}", i, varDec.Description); i++; } Console.WriteLine(); Console.Write("-- Please choose a device to capture: "); int varChoice = 0; if (!int.TryParse(Console.ReadLine(), out varChoice) || varChoice>=i)
Console.WriteLine("The device is not valid!");

ICaptureDevice varDevice =varDevices[varChoice];

varDevice.OnPacketArrival += Device_OnPacketArrival;

varDevice.Filter = "ip and tcp";
Console.WriteLine("-- Listening on {0}, hit 'Ctrl-C' to exit...",varDevice.Description);


varDevice.OnPacketArrival -=Device_OnPacketArrival;

private static void Device_OnPacketArrival(object sender, CaptureEventArgs e)
string varMIP = "BE Server IP Address";
if (e == null || e.Packet == null)

if (e.Packet.Data == null)

var varPacket = PacketDotNet.Packet.ParsePacket(e.Packet.LinkLayerType, e.Packet.Data);
if (varPacket == null)

if (varPacket.GetType()!=typeof(PacketDotNet.EthernetPacket))

var varIP = (PacketDotNet.IpPacket)varPacket.Extract(typeof(PacketDotNet.IpPacket));
if (varIP == null)

string varDIP = varIP.DestinationAddress.ToString();
string varSIP = varIP.SourceAddress.ToString();

if (varSIP != varMIP)

var varTCP = (PacketDotNet.TcpPacket)varPacket.Extract(typeof(PacketDotNet.TcpPacket));
if (varTCP == null)

if (varTCP.PayloadData == null)

var varData = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(varTCP.PayloadData);

if (varData == null)

string varDPort = varTCP.DestinationPort.ToString();
string varSPort = varTCP.SourcePort.ToString();

bool varHTTPS = varSPort == "443";
bool varHTTP = varSPort.Contains("19005") && varData.Contains("text/html") && varData.Contains("gzip");
if ((varHTTPS || varHTTP) && !jsIPList.Contains(varDIP))

string varWay = varHTTP ? "HTTP" : "HTTPS";
string varM1 = "----------------------------------------------------";
string varM2 = string.Format("{0}, {1}, {2}", DateTime.Now, varDIP, varWay);
string varM3 = "Original IP packet: " + varIP.ToString();
string varM4 = "Original TCP packet: " + varTCP.ToString();
string varM5 = "Original TCP Header: " + varData;

if (varDIP != "IP to Exclude")
using (var varProcess = new Process())
varProcess.StartInfo.FileName = "cmd.exe";
varProcess.StartInfo.UseShellExecute = false;
varProcess.StartInfo.RedirectStandardInput = true;
varProcess.StartInfo.RedirectStandardOutput = true;
varProcess.StartInfo.RedirectStandardError = true;
varProcess.StartInfo.CreateNoWindow = true;

string varCommand = "netsh ipsec static add filter filterlist=\"IP_Filter_Grid\" srcaddr=" + varDIP + " dstaddr=me protocol=TCP mirrored=No";
varProcess.StandardInput.AutoFlush = true;


using (var varSMTP = new SmtpClient("Mail Forwarder IP Address"))
using (var varMail = new MailMessage())
varMail.From = new MailAddress("from address");
varMail.To.Add("my e-mail address");
varMail.Subject = "Unauthorised Access to Infor Grid Management Pages";
varMail.Body = varM1 + "\r\n" + varM2 + "\r\n" + "\r\n" + varM3 + "\r\n" + "\r\n" + varM4 + "\r\n" + "\r\n" + varM5;
catch (Exception ex)

SharpPcap can be downloaded from GitHub. It has two Dlls, SharpPcap for capturing packets and Packet.Net for packet analysis. WinPcap needs to be downloaded and installed into the BE server. There is no need to restart the server after installation.

The console application is running in an asynchronous mode, so there is trivial impact on the M3 performance.

The script starts with detecting all the devices first. Then it asks for a device number to listen to. Each device could be a network adapter. A filter is applied to the device for IP and TCP packets. An event to capture the packets is attached to the device. Finally the listening starts.

The event handler has the key logic.

1. Two patterns to find the visit to the grid management pages.

(1) HTTPS: The source port would be 443.

(2) HTTP: The packet contains text/html and gzip.

HTTPS communication is encrypted, so we cannot analyze the packet content. Fortunately LSO never uses the port of 443.

2. If the destination IP address is not on the white list, then it would be added to the IPSec filter list. We need to manually create a IPSec policy and a IPSec filter & Action beforehand.

3. Console would output the captured information.

4. An e-mail alert would be sent with the captured information.

5. A global variable of jsIPList is used to keep the IP addresses already captured to avoid repeated alerts.

Then it works. There were three IT users from local division, who still tried to access to the grid management pages on Monday as usual. Then they found they could not visit it any more, as well as LSO. So far there are no normal users to be blocked, no matter whether they run M3 programs, or download LSO from the installation web page. All of sudden the two-year headache is gone.

If you have the similar concerns to me, I hope the above solution would give you a ride. If you have got any issues using the solution, please reply to this post or send me an e-mail at

Finally my heartfelt appreciations to all the authors on this website, as well as the author of SharpPcap and Packet.Net.